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Understanding the United States'
incarceration rate
What has caused prison sentences to climb so sharply
and consistently in U 4e last four decades2
by WILLIAM T. PIZZI
Introduction
It is no secret that the United States
has an alarming rate of incarcera-
tion. Even the popular press has
jumped on the fact that the U.S.
incarceration rate has reached mul-
tiples of the rates in other western
countries. A 2010 story on the topic
in The Economist featured a dra-
matic cover illustration of Lady
Liberty herself peering out from
behind the bars of a prison cell.' The
article intoned that "[n]o other rich
country is nearly as punitive as the
Land of the Free." As proof of that
fact, it noted that the United States'
incarceration rate is five times
greater than Britain's, nine times
greater than Germany's and twelve
times greater than Japan's.
2
In 2008, the New York Times also
published a feature article on the
topic of the U.S. incarceration rate,
complete with an interactive chart
that allowed readers to click on dif-
ferent countries around the world
and compare incarceration rates.
3
When one clicked on the United
States and then on other countries,
one saw quickly why the article was
entitled Inmate Count in U.S. Dwarfs
Other Nations.'While the U.S. rate had
climbed to 751 citizens per 100,000,
the rates in other western countries
were far, far lower. England's incar-
ceration rate was only 151. Canada's
rate was 108, and Germany incarcer-
ated only 88 citizens per 100,000.
The Times. article also included a
timeline showing the U.S. incarcera-
tion rate from 1925 until 2006.1 What
is fascinating and puzzling about the
rate is the fact that the chart showed
the U.S. rate holding rather steady
through the period between 1925
and 1975 with an incarceration rate
of roughly 150 to 175 citizens incar-
cerated per 100,000. Starting in the
late 1970s, the rate began to climb
sharply and consistently for the next
four decades, until it reached its
present lofty level.
This historical trend line is some-
what baffling. In those decades of the
early and middle twentieth century,
when racial discrimination was
widespread and when constitutional
protections for criminal suspects
were comparatively weak, the U.S.
incarceration rate stayed steady. Yet,
in the period since the 1970s, when
our criminal justice system seemed
much improved, and we had made
considerable strides in our efforts
to eliminate racial discrimination,
the United States began incarcerat-
ing more and more of its citizens for
longer and longer periods of time.
The key question is: what has
caused prison sentences in the U.S. in
the last four decades to become - in
the words of criminologist Michael
Tonry-"far harsher than in any
country to which the United States
would ordinarily be compared"? 6
The standard response is to blame
politicians. Thus, the Economist,
after noting that the U.S. incarcera-
tion rate has quadrupled since 1970,
explains that since then,
... the voters, alarmed at a surge in
violent crime, have demanded fiercer
sentences. Politicians have obliged.
New laws have removed from judges
much of their discretion to set a sen-
tence that takes full account of the
circumstances of the offence. Since no
politician wants to be soft on crime,
such laws, mandating minimum sen-
tences, are seldom softened. On the
contrary, they tend to get harder.
7
Certainly, horrifying crimes
have often led the public to demand
tougher sentencing laws. Thus, the
killing of Jenna Grieshaber in New
York by a parolee led to the passage
of "Jenna's law," which requires that
those convicted of violent offenses
serve 85 percent of their maximum
sentence before becoming eligible
for parole. 8 "Jessica's law," increased
1. Rough Justice, THE ECONOMIST July 22,
2010, available at http://www.economist.com/
node/16640389?story id=16640389
2. id.
3. See Adam Liptak, Inmate Count in U.S.
Dwarfs Other Nations;, NEW YORK TiMES,






7. Too Many Laws, Too Many Prisoners, THE
ECONOMIST, July 22, 2010 available at: http://
www.economist.com/node/16636027?story-id=
16636027
8. See Evelyn Nieves, Our Towns: Lost Cru-
sader Inspires Jenna's Law', NEW YORK TIMES,
May 3, 1998, available at: http://www.nytimes.
comn/1998/0S/03/ny r egio n/o ur-t own s-lo st-
crusader-inspires-jenna-s-law.html
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sentences for sex offenses in Florida
(and inspired similar legislation in
many other states) after a nine-year
old was abducted, raped and killed
in that state.9 Finally, the horrific
murder of Polly Klaas, a twelve-
year old dragged at knifepoint from
a slumber party at her mother's
home, paved the way in California for
the passage of the so-called "three
strikes" law in that state which man-
dated a life sentence upon a third
conviction.
But the Economist's explanation is
ultimately incomplete. First, it is not
just sentences for violent crimes that
have escalated, but for all crimes.
The New York Times article points
out that if lists were compiled based
on annual admissions to prisons per
capita, some European countries
would be higher on the list than the
United States." The U.S. incarcera-
tion rate stems from the fact that
those sentenced to prison for almost
all crimes receive much longer sen-
tences than they would receive in
other countries.
Second, if harsher laws were
passed after 1970 because politi-
cians feared appearing to be "soft
on crime," does this suggest that
politicians in earlier decades found
political advantage in being soft on
crime? And, if one makes the reason-
able assumption that brutal and sen-
sational crimes occur from time to
time in all western countries, why is
it that the politicians in these other
countries are not continually passing
laws mandating, in The Economist's
words, "fiercer sentences" upon
those convicted?
This Article will suggest that an
important, and often overlooked,
factor in • the rise in our incarceration
rate is the fact that the United States
bought heavily into the theory that
harsh punishments deter criminal
behavior. The Article will suggest
that several factors came together to
encourage this dangerous sentenc-
ing philosophy, and to permit it to
take hold in this country. The Article
will also show why harsh deterrent
sanctions, once introduced, will tend
to push all sentences higher.
At the same time, this Article is
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not intended to absolve politicians
for the dramatic and swift rise in our
incarceration rate. Certainly, they
deserve plenty of blame for an incar-
ceration rate that is an embarrass-
ment among western countries, But
once a country begins to accept the
principle that harsh sentences that
are not proportional to the crime in
question are permissible to deter
crime, this puts tremendous pres-
sure on even conscientious legisla-
tors to pass such laws.
A. The Emergence of "Harsh
Deterrence" as a Sentencing
Philosophy
General deterrence has a long and
distinguished history, stretch-
ing back at least to 1764, when the
Italian political philosopher Cesare
Beccaria published his famous essay
ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT, which
expressed a theory of punishment
based heavily on deterrence as a goal
of punishment.' 2 In Chapter XII, on
The Purpose of Punishment, Beccaria
wrote:
The purpose of punishment, there-
fore, is none other than to prevent
the criminal from doing fresh harm
to fellow citizens and to deter others
from doing the same. Therefore, pun-
ishments and the method of inflict-
ing them must be chosen such that,
in keeping with proportionality,
they will make the most efficacious
and lasting impression on the minds
of men with the least torment to the
body of the condemned.' 3
As a result of passages such as
this one, Beccaria is credited with
the insight that punishment has, at
least in part, a preventative func-
tion, namely deterring others from
committing crime. But notice that
Beccaria is not endorsing deterrence
through the imposition of harsh pen-
alties. Rather, Beccaria declares that
punishments must be chosen such
that "in keeping with proportion-
ality," they will deter others from
committing the same crime. Becca-
ria believed that deterrence results
from the certainty of punishment
under a system of laws that man-
dated mild punishments. 14 (Becca-
ria himself was a strong opponent
of cruel punishments, including the
death penalty.)'5
In the United States, deterrence
as a justification for punishment
has, over the last four decades,
become divorced from any obliga-
tion that deterrent punishments be
"in keeping with proportionality." As
a result, draconian sentences have
become rather common in the United
States. Their laudable goal is to deter
the crime in question, but this is a
distortion of traditional deterrence
that has been unleashed on our citi-
zens.
This variant of deterrence, which
I shall refer to as "harsh deterrence,"
is largely an American phenomenon.
In HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUN-
ISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE
BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE,
Professor James Whitman explains
why statutes visiting harsh sanc-
tions on offenders, such as three-
strikes laws, would be "impossible"
in European systems.
The European systems all subscribe
to some version of the principle of
proportionality. This principle holds
9. See Chris Hawke, Fla. Gets Tough New Child
Sex Law, CBS News, May 2, 2005, available at:
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/05/02/
national/main692465.shtml
10. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, GORDON
HAWKINS, AND SAM KAMIN, PUNISHMENT AND
DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT IN
CALIFORNIA (2001).
11. See Adam Litak, supra note 3.
12. See CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND
PUNISHMENTS, AND OTHER WRITINGS, translated
by Aaron Thomas and Jeremy Parzan (2008)
(Translation of Dei delitti e delle pena, published
1764).
13. Id. at 28 (Chapter X1I).
14. See JOHN HOSTETTLER, CESARE BECCARIA:
THE GENIUS OF 'ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS'
124 (2011). In thinking that mild punishments
will deter crime if the risks of being caught and
convicted are high, and the punishment is man-
dated, Beccaria was anticipating social science
research that indicates that an increase in the
detection, arrest, and conviction rate has a great
deterrent effect than an increase in the severity
ol punishment. See Raymond Paternoster, lhe
Deterrent Effect of the Perceived Certainty and
Severity of Punishment, 42 JUSTICE I QUARTERLY
173 (1987). See also Steven N. Durlauf & Daniel
S. Nagin, Imprisonment and crime: Can hoth be
reduced?, 10 CRIMOLOGY & PUBLIC POLICY 13
(2011).
15. See JAMES WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE. CRIM-
INAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE
BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE SO (2003)("...
Beccaria believed that punishment, while it
should be unbending, should generally be mild
with relatively brief terms of incarceration and
relatively light punishments of other kinds." )
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that sentences, though indetermi-
nate, cannot be disproportionate to
the gravity of the offense; the legal
system takes it very seriously; and
it means that sentences of American
severity are effectively impossible.
16
Why then did the United States
come to give free rein to harsh deter-
rence, and dispense with the obli-
gation of proportionality? This is
a complicated question, but let me
suggest several factors that worked
together to encourage harsh deter-
rence in the United States.
B. Loss of Confidence in Judicial
Sentencing
The first factor contributing to harsh
deterrence was a general crisis over
sentencing that began in the early
1970s. Traditionally, trial judges in
the United States had tremendous
power over the fate of defendants
when it came to sentencing. It was
not unusual for a defendant at the
time of sentencing to face a judge
with the power to impose a sentence
for most felonies anywhere in a range
from zero to ten, fifteen, or even fifty
years in prison. Moreover, this power
was almost completely unlimited; as
long as the sentence was within legal
16. Id. at 57.
17. See MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SEN-
TENCEs: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973).
18. See Alan M. Dershowitz, Background Paper
in FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT 67, 102-05
(1976).
19. Thus, for example, the Canadian criminal
code provides that "(w] here an appeal is taken
against sentence, the court of appeal shall...
consider the fitness of the sentence appealed
against, and may on such evidence, if any, as
it thinks fit to require or to receive, ...vary the
sentence within the limits prescribed by law for
the offence of which the accused was convicted."
Section 867, CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA.
20. For an excellent summary of the history
of sentencing decisions in England, including
guideline judgments, see ANDREW ASHWORTII,
SENTENCING AND CRIM1NAL IUSTICE, 34-39 (5th
ed. 2010).
21. See Joshua D. Greene, R. Brian Summer-
villa, Leigh E. Nystrom, John M. Dlarley, Jonathan
D. Cohen, An fMRI Investigation of Emotional
Engagement in Moral Decisionmaking, 293
SCIENCE 2105 (September 14, 2001).
22. See Benedict Carey, ln Battle Hunches Prove
to be Valuable, N.Y. TIMES July 27, 2009 avail-
able at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/28/
health/research/2Bbrain.html
23. See, e.g., PBS Newsbour, Greenspan
Admits "Flaw" to Congress, Predicts More Eco-
nomic Problems, October 23, 2008, available at:
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business/
july-dec08/crisishearing 10-23.html
limits, there was no appellate review.
Not surprisingly, this system-
though still in place in many juris-
dictions today-came under attack.
One of the most influential critics of
sentencing at that time was Marvin
E. Frankel, a federal judge in New
York City, who called for reform
in a book published in 1973. Judge
Frankel attacked the broad sentenc-
ing discretion that had been vested
in judges, which resulted in wide
disparities in the sentences imposed
on similar situated defendants.'
7
Because he was an outstanding judge
and scholar, and because he wrote
from "inside" the federal system,
Frankel's expos6 of the sentencing
system was very influential.
During the same period, there were
also studies published that showed-
not surprisingly-that judges given
the exact same sentencing files
arrived at very different, sometimes
wildly different, sentencing deci-
sions.18
In other common law countries,
the sorts of disparities that occurred
in the United States from judge to
judge did not occur with the same
frequency. Individual sentences have
always been subject to appellate
review in other countries 19 and there
were frequently appellate opinions
offering very detailed guidance on
the sentences that should be imposed
on offenders who have committed a
particular offense. 20 In short, if a sen-
tence was out of line with that nor-
mally given for a particular crime,
a defendant had options to get the
sentence corrected that were tradi-
tionally not available in the United
States.
This does not mean that the rela-
tionship between the judicial branch
and the legislative branch over sen-
tencing has been smooth in other
countries. The public everywhere
thinks sentences are too lenient in the
wake of horrible crimes, and there
has been pressure in many coun-
tries for greater legislative control
over sentencing through mandatory
minimums, sentencing guidelines,
and other restrictions on judicial
sentencing power. But the judiciary
in other countries is better equipped
to defend its sentencing practices
because there usually exists a sub-
stantial jurisprudence on sentencing
that is missing in the United States.
Thus, the sort of sharp restric-
tions.on judicial sentencing that are
common in the United States, such
as high mandatory minimums, have
been much less successful to date in
those countries.
C. The Allure of Economic Proofs That
Harsh Sentences Deter
Another factor contributing to the
emergence of harsh deterrence in
the United States was a love affair
with economics, a love affair that is
on the rocks as a result of the finan-
cial meltdown. We now know that
homo economicus, a theoretical con-
struct in human form, thatacts on
the basis of rationality, self-interest
and knowledge, has much less in
common with homo sapiens than
we thought. Many of our decisions,
even some of our basic moral judg-
ments, are based on emotion, ,21 and
emotions are sometimes a better
guide for action than reason.22 And,
as former Federal Reserve Board
Chair Alan Greenspan confessed to
Congress after the 2008 meltdown,
some of our economic models-so
lovely and elegant in theory-have
been shown to be "flawed" when put
into practice.
23
Most of the last four decades were
heady times for economists. One
indication of the rise in stature of this
field is the fact that, in 1969, a Nobel
Memorial Prize in the Economic Sci-
ences began to be awarded, chosen
in the same way as other prizes,
though endowed by a bank, not the
Nobel Foundation. lt also appeared
in this period that economists had at
their disposal powerful mathemati-
cal tools-which they were only too
happy to display for :the legal estab-
lishment-that could answer impor-
tant questions, such as the deterrent
effect of harsh sanctions. The formula
seemed simple and powerful; take
a number of data sets, convert the
data into variables, and regression
analysis will then grind out a rather
precise mathematical answer to your
question. Economics encouraged
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legislatures to pass harsh deterrent
sentences by "proving" the deterrent
power of harsh sentences.
In 1975, the economist Isaac
Ehrlich published a paper in which
he used data from the period 1933-
1969 and found that there was a
statistically significant negative
correlation between the murder rate
and execution rate, meaning that
there was a deterrent effect from
the death penalty.24 He estimated
that for each execution approxi-
mately seven or eight murders were
deterred.
25
In the years following publica-
tion of the Ehrlich study, there were
numerous articles in economics
journals and law reviews that chal-
lenged Ehrlich's methodology and his
conclusions.26 Critics claimed that
Ehrlich's data was skewed by the
seven-year period from 1963-69, and
that Ehrlich had claimed that execu-
tions in that period had triggered a
decline in homicides during those
same years.27 However, the decline
in homicides in that period had
taken place across all states, includ-
ing those that did not have the death
penalty, so Ehrlich's model did not
show a correlation between execu-
tions and murders.
28
This ebb and flow of "proof" and
then counterattack on the proof
continues almost to the present,
with proofs claiming that the death
penalty deters five29 or even 1830
homicides a year, followed up by
strong attacks showing that the
variables were not independent,
that other factors accounted for the
decline, etc.3
D. The "Deterrence Wager"
The problem with the debate among
economists over the deterrent effect
of the death penalty or other deter-
rent penalties is that the counter-
attacks do not resolve the issue.
Consider, for example, the conclusion
of a report of a panel put together by
the National Academy of sciences to
evaluate Ehrlich's work. The panel
concluded that "the available studies
provide.no useful evidence on the
deterrent effect of capital punish-
ment." 2 The panel then went on to
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state that "research on the deter-
rent effects of capital sanctions is not
likely. to provide results that will or
should have much influence on policy
makers .33
Exposing the weaknesses of a
study does not prove the opposite.
What the panel, in the wake of the
Ehrlich study, was telling legislatures
was, "Don't look to us for answers one
way or the other as to the deterrent
effect question." The same is true
of those economists exposing the
weaknesses of more recent claims of
strong deterrent effects.
34
This helps explain the pressure
on legislatures to pass harsh deter-
rent sanctions. Once freed from any
obligation of proportionality, and
presented with a harsh law aimed at
child molestation (or whatever hor-
rible crime rouses public ire), what
is the reason for not passing the law?
This is a contemporary version of
Pascal's Wager, namely the deter-
rence wager. If it is possible that a
harsh minimum will deter ten or
twenty such crimes each year, why
should a legislator vote against such
a law in the absence of proof that it
will not deter?
E. The Rising Tide. of Sentences
The emergence of harsh deterrent
sentences certainly explains some
of the rise in our prison population.
Some of the more famous harsh
deterrent laws passed over the last
24. See Isaac Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of
Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death,
65 AMER. ECON. REV. 397 (1975).
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Peter Passell & John B. Taylor, The
Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: Another
View, 67 AMER. ECON. REV. 445 (1977).
27. Id.
28. See John Donohue & Justin Wolfers,
The Death Penalty: No Evidence for Deter-
rence, ECONOMISTS' VOICE, 1, 2 (April 2006)
at http ://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article-1170&context-ev
29. See H.Naci Mocan & R. Kaj Gitting, Getting
Off Death Row: Commuted Sentences and the
Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 46 J. L. &
EcoN. 453 (2003).
30. See Hashem Dezhbakhsh, Paul H. Rubin,
dfld Joanna Shepherd, Does Capital Punishment
Have a Deterrent Effect? New Evidence from Post-
morten Panel Data, S AMER. L, AND ECON. REV.
344 (2003).
31. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan, Death and Deter-
rence Redux: Law and Causal Reasoning on Capital
Punishment, 4OHIO S. J. CRIM. L. 255 (2006);
decades include drug laws mandat-
ing ten or fifteen year minimum sen-
tences, or habitual offender laws that
have been passed in probably every
state. But why is it that punishment
for all crimes seems to have risen
over the last four decades?
This is a complicated issue, but
let me offer two reasons why harsh
deterrence, once unleashed, will
raise all sentences. The most obvious
is that it is hard to put a limit on
crimes deserving harsh deterrent
sanctions. If it is possible that a harsh
sentence will deter those who might
start to experiment with drugs, why
shouldn't a legislature increase the
sentence for carjacking, or robbery,
or crimes with a gun, in an effort
to lower the rate of those crimes as
well?
But there is another subtle, yet
powerful, force at work that helps
explain why judges will tend to sen-
tence other crimes more harshly
even if the number of harsh deter-
rent sanctions in the jurisdiction
is few and judges retain broad sen-
tencing discretion. The starting
point for understanding this phe-
nomenon is the research of Profes-
sor Paul Robinson and others who
have demonstrated that, even across
demographic, gender, and cultural
lines, citizens possess broadly shared
intuitions about the relative blame-
worthiness of different criminal
acts.35 Given these shared intuitions,
Richard Berk, New Claims About Executions and
General Deterrence: Deja vu All Over Again, 2
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 303 (2005); John J.
Donahue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of
Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate,
58 STAN. L. REV. 791 (2005).
32. NAT'L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, DETERRENCE
AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS
OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES 3, 9, 12
(Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1978).
33. Id.
34. In their 2005 article exposing the weak-
nesses of articles claiming to show a deterrent
effect from capital punishments, Professors
John Donohue and Justin Wolfers state that "as
to whether executions raise or lower the homi-
cide rate, we remain profoundly uncertain." See
Donohue & Wolters, supra note 28, at 843.
35. See Paul H. Robinson, Robert Kurzban &
Owen D. Jones, The Origins of Shared Intuitions
of Justice, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1633 (2007); Paul H.
Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice:
Implications for Criminal Law and Justice Policy,
81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2007).
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one should expect that powerful
deterrent punishments for even a
handful of crimes would eventually
have an impact on the sentences for
crimes that everyone would consider
far more serious. Thus, if five years is
the required minimum sentence for
possession of cocaine, it will put tre-
mendous pressure on judges to sen-
tence at something close to that level
(or even higher) for the many crimes
that we would generally consider far
more serious crimes.
In short, though we do not have
a strong societal understanding
of the exact sentence that crimes
like aggravated assault, robbery, or
sexual abuse of a minor deserve as
"just dessert," we know quite well
that these crimes are more serious
than possession of cocaine, and
sentences will tend to reflect our
strongly ingrained instincts about
the relative blameworthiness of dif-
ferent criminal acts. Thus, even in
a jurisdiction where judges retain
considerable sentencing discretion
for most crimes, sentences will over
time be influenced by even a few
harsh deterrent punishments for
particular crimes.
F. The Importance of Proportionality
The sad lesson the United States
demonstrates is that, once a country
abandons the requirement of pro-
portionality in sentencing and
permits harsh deterrence to take
36. See Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl Marie
Webster, Countering Punitiveness: Understanding
Stability in Canada's Imprisonment Rate, 40 LAw
& Soc'Y REV. 325, 327-29 (2006).
37. Id. at 331.
38. Id.
39. One can see the importance of § 718.1 in
a case like R. v. Priest, ±996 CarswellOnt 3588,
110 C.C.C(3d) 289, 30 O.R. (3d) 538, 93 O.A.C.
163, 1 C.R. (5th) 275, where the appellate court
vacated a one-year prison sentence imposed on
a first-time offender on the ground that the sen-
tence was wholly disproportionate to the crime
and the offender under the circumstances.
40. See R. v. Smith (Edward Dewey), (1987] 1
S.C.R. 1045. In his opinion, Justice Lamer stated:
This does not mean that the judge or the legisla-
tor can no longer consider general deterrence or
other penological purposes that go beyond the
particular offender...but only that the resulting
sentence must not he grossly disproportionate
to what the offender deserves. 1 S.C.R. 1045 at
1073.
41. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S.
957 (1991).
hold on its soil, harsh deterrence will
push all sentences higher, limited
only by the resources a jurisdiction
can commit to staffing and running
prisons.
Public pressure for harsher sen-
tences in response to horrifying
crimes is, of course, not limited to
the United States, and incarceration
rates have gone up in some other
countries. But they have avoided the
extremes seen in the United States
because there is usually a much stron-
ger commitment to proportionality
in sentencing. Mention was made
earlier of the commitment to propor-
tionality in European systems. But
another country that may have more
to teach us about proportionality is
Canada, our neighbor to the north,
which shares our common law tradi-
tion, and has crime rates that gener-
ally track with the ebb and flow of the
U.S. rate.36 Yet that country's incar-
ceration rate remains roughly what
it was forty or fifty years ago, slightly
more than a 100 people incarcerated
per 100,000.
37
What has enabled Canada-so
far-to keep its incarceration rate so
low compared to the United States?
This is a complicated question that
would be well worth a longer exami-
nation than is possible here. But one
thing that has certainly helped is
the strong commitment in Canada
to proportionality in sentencing.
Section 718.1 of Canadian Criminal
Code, under the heading "Fundamen-
tal principle," requires that: "A sen-
tence must be proportionate to the
gravity of the offence and the degree
of responsibility of the offender.1
38
This principle plays a pivotal role in
sentencing jurisprudence in Canada.
One can see this principle directly
in the way courts review individual
sentences, 39 but also indirectly in the
willingness of the Canadian Supreme
Court to strike down a mandatory
minimum of seven years for import-
ing drugs as violative of: the pro-
tection against cruel and unusual
punishment in § 12 of the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms. 40
In the United States, proportion-
ality in sentencing has come to be
viewed as simply an option rather
than a mandate. Too many citizens
pay a heavy price as a result.
Conclusion
Putting the blame for our shock-
ing incarceration rate solely on the
backs of politicians is both unfair
and unproductive. This Article main-
tains that a number of factors came
together to permit, and even encour-
age, the escalation of sentences in the
United States. One of those factors
was acceptance of the illusion that
harsh deterrent sanctions will deter
undesirable social conduct. Sadly,
harshness breeds harshness and
harsh deterrent sentences will push
all sentences higher.
If we wish to reform the system,
there are many options. So far, the
Supreme Court has been unwilling
to see our constitutional protection
against cruel and unusual punish-
ment as a shield from brutally long
sentences.41 But we are at the point
where the threat of a harsh deter-
rent sentence is undercutting other
constitutional rights. What good are
trial rights such as the assistance of
counsel, the right to confront wit-
nesses, and the right to have a jury
decide one's fate, if the risk of convic-
tion is too steep to allow a defendant,
even one with a strong defense, to
exercise these rights? *
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